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Trends In Communist Propaganda

5 Sept 74

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda


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CYPRUS

USSR PRESSES FOR CONFERENCE, CLAIMS NATO SEEKING NEW BASES

Moscow comment continues to focus on the proposal in the 22 August Soviet Government statement for an enlarged conference on Cyprus in the UN framework, designed to wrest the problem from the "NATO family." Moscow has in effect acknowledged the proposal's cool reception in the West, IZVESTIYA on the 27th calling for "vigilance and a resolute rebuff" to forces opposed to the Soviet initiative. It has also hinted at the possibility the initiative will fail: PRAVDA on the 28th reported Greek plans to raise the Cyprus question at the forthcoming UN General Assembly if the Soviet proposal "is not supported by other states"; Moscow has thus far not expressed an opinion on this idea.

Even-handedly sympathizing with the suffering of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Soviet media have charged that any solution to the problem is being held jealously in NATO hands while the disinterested Soviet proposal has been blocked by those countries, particularly the United States. Moscow had reported Ecevit's preference for the Geneva talks, but has played down the Turkish rejection of the Soviet initiative while emphasizing "NATO"--primarily U.S.--opposition. But Moscow has not explained Washington's position, merely asserting, in an Arabic-language Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 29th, that it is based on "fear of seeing its shameful role in Cyprus unveiled." The statement came in the context of standard charges of a "colonialist conspiracy" in the eastern Mediterranean ultimately aimed against the Arab world.

SPECULATION ON NATO FACILITIES Exploiting the uncertainty about the fate of NATO facilities in Greece following Athens' withdrawal from the military structure of the alliance, Moscow has speculated on NATO plans to fill the gap. Following initial Soviet reaction to suggestions that Israel might offer facilities to the United States,* RED STAR on 4 September, as reported by TASS, claimed that three countries had emerged as suitable replacements for Greece in NATO's "feverish search" for new bases--Italy, Turkey and Israel. Narrowing down the choices, RED STAR observed that acceptance of proposals by "military circles"

* Initial Soviet comment on a possible Israeli base offer, and reportage on the possibility of a Turkish facility, are discussed in the 28 August TRENDS, page 3.

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In non-NATO Israel would mean "the final unmasking of the NATO ringleaders in the eyes of the Arab world." As for Turkey, the paper claimed this was being considered, although "official circles" in NATO were keeping quiet about the possibility of transferring bases to Turkey. "There remains only Italy," RED STAR concluded, pointing out that, "however," broad sections of the Italian public were opposed to granting facilities to NATO.

An earlier RED STAR article, by Gavrilov and Virogradov on 25 August, implicitly underlined a question of prime concern to Moscow in the bases issue--freedom of passage through the Dardanelles. The article repeated--with a notable addition--a standard "proximity" formula in asserting that the significance of bases on Greek territory was determined, in the opinion of the NATO command, by their proximity to the borders of the socialist countries "and the Black Sea straits," as well as to Arab countries. Such a specific mention of the straits in this formulation is highly unusual, if not unique. RED STAR made no reference to Turkey, and the possibility of a Turkish NATO base has appeared only infrequently in other comment. A Drobkov article in PRAVDA on 29 August quoted without comment a statement attributed to the Washington POST that in order to compensate for the consequences of Greece's decision to withdraw from the NATO military structure, it would be necessary to expand NATO bases in Italy "and there also arises the question of the advisability of creating new bases in Turkey." PRAVDA also claimed that NATO was seriously considering the possibility of "using some part of the territory of Cyprus" for its "militarist purposes."

Soviet comment in general has focused more on Italy as a primary candidate for enlarged NATO facilities. Moscow has noted reports of U.S. deliveries of military equipment to the island of Lampedusa. And an Italian-language Moscow broadcast on the 30th, claiming increased fascist activity in Italy, declared that the transfer of bases to that country would not only aggravate the general atmosphere in the Mediterranean but would also be "dangerous for the internal situation in Italy in view of the historical precedent in Greece, where a reactionary regime was put in power with the brutal interference of NATO." PRAVDA commentator Vladimir Yermakov repeated the theme the following day, charging that NATO bases "are becoming the sources which give material support to subversive fascist forces" within member-states.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW SEES MIXED TRENDS, STRESSES PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

In a variety of reports and comment on U.S. developments over the past week, Moscow has continued to project the attitude of cautious optimism it evinced in its initial assessments of the Ford Administration. PRAVDA gave a straightforward account of President Ford's press conference on 30 August, noting its concentration on domestic matters but stressing the President's positive remarks on the U.S. preparation for SALT II. Considerable comment was devoted to the Senate approval of a record peacetime defense budget, and although much of it was negative some of it professed to see grounds for optimism in the growing opposition to military expenditures purportedly manifested by public opinion and prominent political figures. In the meantime, there was evidence of a renewal of the hawk-dove controversy in the Soviet Union, with RED STAR and PRAVDA taking sharply opposing positions on the appropriate goals for Soviet policy.

A common feature of much of the comment was the assertion that U.S. public opinion and prominent political figures were firmly committed to the goals of detente. An article in IZVESTIYA on 28 August, for example, quoted Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, as saying that the American people had become distrustful of the Defense Department because, as IZVESTIYA put it, they felt that it was pursuing policies inconsistent with the current international situation. The article quoted Senator Brooke as saying that the quest for security should be based not only on military measures but on "continuing efforts within the framework of the SALT talks." It also quoted Secretary Kissinger's statement in a 20 August speech questioning the utility of seeking security through a constant buildup of strategic forces. Such an effort, it quoted him as saying, "will lead only to a new balance at higher levels of complexity and risk." This article and others noted the impact of deteriorating economic conditions on U.S. public opinion, interpreting this as a factor which was encouraging opposition to the Pentagon's policies.

On the 28th and 29th of August and on the 1st of September, RED STAR published articles which were more militant and critical of the United States than the general run of comment in the central press and radio media. The last one, an editorial, included a statement on the goals of Soviet policy which expressed in classic terms the preference of the Soviet hawks: "The stronger our country

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and its armed forces become, the shorter will be the roads leading mankind toward lasting peace." The previous day, PRAVDA, in an article on the Soviet proposal in the United Nations to ban weather warfare, had included a similarly classic statement of the dove position--Brezhnev's statement on 21 July at the Polish Sjem that "if you want peace, you must pursue a policy of peace and struggle for this policy." These contrasting formulas have cropped up repeatedly over the past year in a seemingly consistent pattern of internal polemics.

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INDIAN OCEAN BASES

TASS REGRETS "INACCURACY" IN PRESIDENT'S REMARK ON USSR BASES

President Ford's remark--in response to a question in his 28 August news conference about expansion of the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia--that the Soviet Union had three Indian Ocean bases drew Moscow's first criticism, albeit mild, of the President in a belated TASS commentary. The initial TASS account of the news conference made no mention of the Indian Ocean issue, although a fuller PRAVDA report on 30 August did note that the President said he supported the expansion (the President said "limited" expansion) of the United States' Diego Garcia base. But where the President went on to add that he did not view this as any challenge to the Soviet Union, that the USSR already had three major naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean, and that this "particular construction [Diego Garcia] is, I think, a wise policy," PRAVDA said only that the President claimed that expansion of the base "would not complicate the situation in the area." PRAVDA also reported him as concluding that the base should not "lead to any spread of problems" in the Middle East.

On the 31st, TASS commentator Krasikov mildly chided the President for a "regrettable inaccuracy" in declaring that expansion of the U.S. military base on Diego Garcia did not represent any challenge to the Soviet Union "which, as he said, already has three major naval operating bases" in the Indian Ocean. Krasikov carefully absolved the President himself of the error, declaring that he had been, "unfortunately, misinformed by his staff," as in reality "there are neither three nor even a single Soviet naval base" in the Indian Ocean. Moscow last winter, in a flurry of comment about the Diego Garcia issue, had denied that the Soviet Union was operating naval bases in the area and countercharged that the United States was planning to construct a chain of bases to control the sea routes and intimidate the littoral nations.*

Krasikov pointedly recalled "recent" testimony by CIA Director Colby before the Senate Armed Services Committee--testimony in a 11 July closed-door hearing, made public on 2 August--as reported in the New York TIMES on 3 August. Krasikov noted that Colby had described the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean "as a relatively small one"; the TIMES quoted Colby as saying small "and inactive." Krasikov

* See the 21 February 1974 TRENDS, page 19.

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also noted that Colby had expressed the opinion that the final level of Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean "would depend on what forces the United States allotted for that area." Summing up "Pentagon plans" for making Diego Garcia a "major U.S. naval base" in the Indian Ocean, Krasikov noted that these plans had met with "serious objections" from the U.S. Congress and had triggered a wave of protests from countries in the Indian Ocean.

While the Krasikov TASS commentary was broadcast in English to the United States and Britain (Diego Garcia being a British possession), publicity for the commentary seemed aimed primarily at Asian audiences, with rebroadcasts in Indian languages as well as Indonesian, Burmese, Persian and others.

Soviet media apparently did not pick up a Defense Department spokesman's statement subsequent to the President's remarks that listed the three Soviet bases as Berbera, Somalia; Umm Qasr, Iraq; and Aden, South Yemen. But a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on 4 September cited the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) as labeling "fabrications" U.S. Defense Department reports on the existence of a Soviet military base in Iraq. INA, Moscow radio said, declared that the Pentagon needed such reports to justify the establishment of a "big military base" in Diego Garcia and the presence of U.S. naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and Iraq was "indignant" over the presence of military bases in the area.

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VIETNAM

HANOI MARKS DRV NATIONAL DAY; PHAM VAN DONG ADDRESSES MEETING

Hanoi marked the 2 September 29th anniversary of the founding of the DRV in a traditional fashion on the 1st with a wreath-laying ceremony at the cemetery of "fallen heroes," a diplomatic reception, and an evening rally which heard Premier Pham Van Dong deliver his customary address. The usual display of top leadership at the rally included--in addition to Pham Van Dong--Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi. Last year in a departure from normal practice, Defense Minister Giap was absent from the anniversary ceremonies, however, his attendance this year is consistent with his practice in recent months of appearing in public at the time of major events.*

Of the Politburo members, Le Duc Tho has not attended a National Day rally since 1971, and Hoang Van Hoan since 1970. Neither Van Tien Dung nor Tran Quoc Hoan has regularly attended the gathering, although Dung was present last year--presumably as a stand-in for Giap. Pham Hung's whereabouts remain unreported by the media, and his last public appearance was in September 1967. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who was in Hanoi during national day for the second consecutive year--this time on a stopover between visits to the DPRK and GDR--also participated in the major events of the day and spoke briefly at the rally.

PHAM VAN DONG RALLY SPEECH As last year, Pham Van Dong in his rally speech divided his remarks between the DRV economy and the implementation of the peace agreement. While generally reviewing the level of recovery achieved by the various sectors of the economy, the premier's discussion of the DRV's many postwar domestic problems was cursory and for the most part did not include specific measures to deal with them.

* After a brief period of activities in late September and early October 1973, Giap did not appear in public for almost seven months--then returning to public view to participate in celebrations marking May Day and the 20th anniversary of the communist victory at Dien Bieh Phu. After appearing at a banquet on 28 May, he again dropped from sight until 28 August when he addressed a division of troops on the occasion of the national anniversary.

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Aside from expounding on the need to fulfill the 1974 and 1975 plans in anticipation of next year's 45th anniversary of the party, 30th anniversary of the DRV's founding, and 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth, long-range planning was otherwise ignored in Dong's speech. This stood in contrast to his more distant look into the future presented in last year's speech that characterized the 1973-1975 period as a prelude to the "long-term plan of 1976-1980." Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi's 4 February speech before the DRV National Assembly formally announced that the DRV's second five-year plan would take place from 1976 to 1980 and urged the study of a "10- to 15-year developmental plan."* Since Nghi's speech, Vietnamese communist propaganda has not elaborated on these planning goals and Pham Van Dong's failure to make even token mention of the five-year plan suggests uncertainty in the Hanoi hierarchy as to the direction their economy is to take, a year and a half after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

Uncertainty about future goals was also suggested by Pham Van Dong's failure to reiterate previously voiced North Vietnamese resolve to slow the growth of its population. While the premier did take tangential note of the North's "rapidly increasing population" in his discussion of problems involved in commodity distribution, he did not follow through with any elaboration on the population problem as a whole. It would have been particularly appropriate for Dong to have pursued the population issue since Hanoi had just released, on 29 August, the results of the North's second general census, conducted on 1 April. A 30 August NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the census results confirmed the regime's intention, spelled out in leaders speeches earlier this year, of encouraging birth control and called for a reduction in the rate of growth from the present 2.9 percent to two percent and eventually to a "much smaller percentage."

The premier, in his remarks on the situation regarding the peace agreement, reiterated standard complaints against the Saigon government and alleged U.S. intervention in the South and "massive" introduction of weapons and war materiel. Whereas last year Dong had echoed the exultant tone of Hanoi comment in the wake of the "victory" of the peace agreement, this year he offered a somber assessment, accusing the United States and Thieu of having "wrecked the peace" and "sabotaged" the agreement. He praised

* Le Thanh Nghi's National Assembly speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 February 1974, pages 12-15.

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the southern fight against "nibbling and pacification," but did repeat the more optimistic claims about military achievements in the South which have appeared in the propaganda in recent days.

Dong's traditional expression of thanks to the DRV's socialist allies failed to include the customary mention of the support and assistance these nations had rendered and was diluted to an assertion of "warm sentiments and heartfelt and profound gratitude to the peoples" of the Soviet Union, China, and the socialist countries. Likewise lacking in this year's address was any allusion to restoration of international unity in the communist movement--an issue that has been raised in his past national day talks.

DONG AVOIDS, DRV COMMENT CONTINUES CALLS FOR THIEU'S OUSTER

Pham Van Dong in his anniversary address did not voice the revived line, reflected in scattered communist propaganda since 15 August, on an urban struggle in the South to "topple" Thieu and set up a new government to implement the peace agreement. Instead, Dong adhered to the formulation which had been standard since the peace agreement and reflects its spirit--that is, calling for a struggle against Thieu and "for peace, freedom, democracy, a better life, and national concord," instead of Thieu's ouster. The "topple Thieu" slogan was also absent from the NHAN DAN anniversary editorial, but it appeared in the editorial of 29 August and other propaganda and was voiced by PRG/NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho on the same platform with Dong at the anniversary rally.

Dong's failure to embrace the formulation on overthrowing Thieu and its continued appearance in the media may reflect unresolved differences in the North Vietnamese leadership regarding the situation in the South and the best course of action there. Since the peace agreement, only one of Hanoi's top leaders is known to have called attention to the ultimate objective of ousting Thieu. Second-ranking Politburo member Truong Chinh took an atypically strong line on the South in a 9 February speech--as reported by Hanoi radio--welcoming the just-concluded session of the National Assembly. While routinely endorsing the "immediate tasks" of economic reconstruction, Truong Chinh went on to stress that "we must not forget that the puppet administration has not been toppled after the U.S. withdrawal" and to recall that Ho Chi Minh had "urged our people to 'fight until all Americans are ousted and the puppets

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are toppled."* Truong Chinh did not go on, as recent propaganda has, to identify Thieu's overthrow as a goal of the current struggle in the South.

Another Politburo member, Hanoi's top economic planner Le Thanh Kiem, seemed to be representing concerns at variance with Truong Chinh's in an article in the 14 March NHAN DAN, broadcast by Hanoi radio. Kiem warned that "we should not be bent on maintaining vigilance and making preparations for war, and thus become unsteady and undecided in mobilizing all forces and latent capabilities to intensively perform the task of economic restoration and development with the aim of achieving socialist industrialization."

PRESS, RADIO COMMENT A 29 August NHAN DAN editorial went beyond previous recent Hanoi propaganda to offer the evaluation that "conditions are ripe" in urban areas "for the development of a large and broad mass struggle movement to oppose the United States and topple Thieu." The editorial maintained that the Saigon government is plagued by acute internal disputes and "serious contradictions" of an "explosive character."

The editorial's appraisal of the military outlook in the South was marked by similar optimism. It portrayed a "new situation" in which the ARVN "has reduced its large-scale operations while abandoning many isolated positions, shrinking back in an attempt to avoid losses and reorganize its defense system." The communist forces, according to the editorial, are in a "new stance" with a "good position to continuously attack and win victories." Repeating a claim made occasionally by Hanoi media since last March, the editorial maintained that the communists--in the Mekong Delta and the central Truong Bo plains--have recovered "almost all the areas which the enemy has illegally occupied since 28 January 1973" and "in some areas" even improved the "position and strength of the revolution" in comparison with the situation when the peace agreement was signed.**

An unattributed "article" broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese on 1 September repeated the formulation on toppling Thieu and forming a new government and was even more confident than the NHAN DAN

* Truong Chinh's remarks on toppling Thieu were included in recorded excerpts of his speech broadcast by Hanoi on the following day, but briefer reports on his speech in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN omitted the passage on Thieu.

** Previous Vietnamese communist claims to have recovered territory are noted in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974, page 20.

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editorial in appraising the military situation in South Vietnam. The broadcast not only flatly stated that territory in the South lost since the peace accord had been regained, but also indicated that the military balance of forces had shifted, giving the communists "supremacy on the military front." Such an unqualified claim of military superiority is unusual; Hanoi propaganda normally follows the less categorical line, reflected in Dong's national day speech, that the balance of forces is moving more and more in favor of the communists.

Claims that the balance has tipped to favor the communists had been raised in two important series of articles by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victory), first in August and later in November and December 1973.* Chien Thang's August articles not only claimed that the "Vietnamese revolutionary forces" were stronger than the "reactionary forces," but also praised the "extremely important role" that North Vietnam historically had played in this balance. In the past year a particularly positive appraisal of the balance of forces was offered by Defense Minister Giap in a 7 May television talk which echoed the Chien Thang view that the "posture and forces" of the revolution were "much stronger" than Saigon's "as far as the entire country is concerned."

The North's relationship to the struggle in South Vietnam was addressed in exhortatory terms at the conclusion of the 1 September article broadcast by Hanoi. The radio affirmed that "revolution means offensive" and vowed:

In this autumn of revolution, the entire North, encouraged by new developments of the southern revolution and overwhelmed by enthusiasm and pride, pledges to wholeheartedly assist the South in attaining its ultimate goals.

PEKING COMMENT ON DRV ANNIVERSARY SUGGESTS INCREASED SUPPORT

Peking this year marked the DRV National Day in much the same fashion as in 1973, but elements in the behavior and content of the media may reflect somewhat greater support for the Vietnamese. Thus, while last year the Chinese leaders' message was publicized

* The Chien Thang articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 August 1973, pages 7-9, and 12 December 1973, pages S1-S3.

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only by Vietnamese media, the greetings this year were broadcast by Peking radio's Vietnamese-language service. In addition, the message broke new ground in wishing the Vietnamese greater success "in their struggle for the eventual liberation of the entire nation."*

The usual anniversary editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY also used language which went further in supporting communist military action in South Vietnam. Thus, the editorial lauded the South Vietnamese "people's" efforts to "hit back in strength" against Saigon attacks. Previously, Peking had been more cautious in endorsing communist attacks. A 21 November 1973 joint communique marking the visit of PRG/NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho did affirm that the South Vietnamese were entitled to take "all resolute measures"-- language more restrained than the current editorial. Peking notably avoided expression of support for counterattacks in comment marking the PRG's 5th anniversary this June. Consistent with Peking's line in the past year, the editorial charged the GVN with violating the peace agreement "with the support of the United States." At the time of the anniversary last year, Peking was avoiding criticism of either the United States or Saigon.

Though Peking followed last year's practice in avoiding offers of assistance while pledging support and solidarity with its allies, the Chinese took more care to stress the ideological basis of Sino-Vietnamese relations and to underline Peking's internationalist duty to back the Vietnamese. Last year the leaders' message and editorial made no reference to Marxism-Leninism, and only the editorial once mentioned Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty"; this year both the message and editorial stressed that Sino-Vietnamese relations were founded on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" and that China would resolutely perform its "proletarian internationalist duties."

The DRV ambassador's anniversary reception was attended by Li Hsien-nien and Hua Kuo-feng; two CCP Politburo members--Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hsiao-ping--had similarly attended last year. NCNA once again reported toasts, rather than speeches, by the Chinese foreign minister and DRV ambassador at the conclave. NCNA coverage of anniversary receptions in Peking disclosed that DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Sam, and Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission Nguyen Van Bien are presently in Peking. Ly Ban, who in previous years has negotiated agreements on PRC aid, had been noted present in Peking, earlier, greeting the DRV economic delegation headed by Le Thanh Nghi on its arrival in China on 1 August.

* Hanoi radio's Vietnamese-language version of this phrase differed slightly, and translates as "in their struggle to liberate the entire nation."

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING STRONGLY CONDEMNS INDIA'S "ANNEXATION" OF SIKKIM

A 3 September PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article has made the sharpest Chinese criticism of India in recent years, condemning the Gandhi government's recent moves to tighten Indian control over Sikkim and warning of wider Indian ambitions in South Asia. The article was prompted by the Indian government's 29 August proposal for a constitutional amendment giving Sikkim representation in the Indian parliament and a status similar to that of an Indian state. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article in July had voiced milder criticism of Indian ambitions in regard to Sikkim, softpedaling criticism of Mrs. Gandhi and avoiding explicit condemnation of Indian actions.

Denouncing the proposed amendment as a "flagrant act of colonialist expansion" and a "grave incident," Commentator alleged that reducing Sikkim to an Indian colony was merely part of India's longstanding design to become a "sub-superpower" and to "lord it over South Asia." Making a rare reference to past Indian territorial aggrandizement fostered by Nehru, the article went on to accuse the present Gandhi regime of going even further along the expansionist road, citing particularly its role in dismembering Pakistan and its use of India's recent successful atomic test to engage in "nuclear blackmail." It also made the first Chinese reference to an alleged Indian government scheme to establish a group of South Asian countries "with itself as the overlord."

Peking typically charged an alleged supportive Soviet role behind India's moves, asserting that Moscow's backing for increased Indian control over Sikkim has bared its position as "protector of Indian expansionists." Peking saw the current cooperation between the two states as "the main cause" of instability in South Asia and "a serious threat" to other South Asian states.

The Chinese accompanied their attack with several NCNA replays of South Asian comment--including some from India--critical of New Delhi's stance toward Sikkim. Peking at the same time has portrayed favorably its own relations with smaller South Asian states. On 28 August, NCNA responded favorably to Nepal's efforts since May to disarm anti-PRC Tibetan refugees residing in Nepal. The report noted that the rebels had infiltrated into Nepal following their retreat with the Dalai Lama into India in the wake of the 1959 Tibetan uprising and that they had received foreign aid.

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from unspecified "rich and powerful countries." It praised Nepal's efforts to disarm the Tibetans and thereby insure Nepalese internal security and eliminate a sensitive irritant in Sino-Nepalese relations. And NCNA on 29 August reported that the Chinese Red Cross society that day notified its Bangladesh counterpart that it was granting 2 million yuan in relief goods for recent flood victims.

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U S S R

BREZHNEV PROTEGE URGES STRONGER PARTY ROLE IN ECONOMY

The clearest indication yet of what Brezhnev may have had in mind by his December 1973 CPSU plenum call for a "party style" in economic leadership has been provided by Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko in an August KOMMUNIST UKRAINY journal article. The prescription, according to Vatchenko, is a more active party role at all levels of economic decision-making and--implicitly, at least--a corresponding delimitation of the independent authority of economic administrators. Although calls for increased party activism in the economy have been made before, Vatchenko's article attracts attention because it is unusually assertive and one-sided in its presentation (it fails, for example, to include the standard caveat that party officials should be careful not to take over the functions of economic administrators), and because its author is clearly a member of Brezhnev's entourage.

Brezhnev's own words on the "party style" of economic administration at the December plenum left much to be explained. Warning against a "narrow economic" or even "technocratic" approach to economic administration, he called for a "party approach in all spheres of economic activity." He declared that the party's economic policy rested on "two pillars"--improvement of economic leadership by placing it on a scientific and party basis and mobilization of the masses. In his 14 June election speech he added that a "party style" involves fighting bureaucratism and narrow-departmental and localist tendencies and that the "essence of a party approach" is to combine improvement of the work of economic organs with mobilization of the masses. In the 14 June speech he also declared that "we will continue to resolutely and consistently assert a Leninist, party style in the work of state organs."

Brezhnev's implicit call for more party intervention in management of the economy recalls the policy he apparently pushed at the December 1969 CPSU plenum. In the aftermath of that plenum, party officials were encouraged to take a more active role in economic matters, and some displacement of economic administrators by party officials appeared to have taken place. While there has been no sign as yet that a similar development has emerged from last year's plenum, the Vatchenko article serves notice that pressures for expanding the party role in this sphere remain active.

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VATCHENKO ARTICLE Vatchenko's article, entitled "Party Style--
For All Links of Administration," cited
Brezhnev's December statements about asserting a "party style"
and "party approach" in all economic activity and his June state-
ment about asserting a "party style" in the work of state organs.
He then proceeded to outline an increased role for the party,
presenting this as the key to progress. He called the party's
experience in leading the economy "one of the most effective
factors for further speeding of economic progress" and declared
that "introduction of a party style in all echelons of economic
activity creates the fundamental basis for improving the system
of administration."

He called on party organs to teach economic leaders to "combine
one-man leadership with collegiality." Citing a lagging plant in
his oblast, he asserted that the plant had failed its plan precisely
because the director "did not rely on the party organization and
ceased to consider the collective's opinion." In contrast, he
held up as a model a plant director who "does not overpower his
subordinates with his authority," is "not ashamed" to learn from
others, "relies on the party organization," and "considers collective
opinion." Thus, one-man leadership is combined with collegiality,
and this, according to Vatchenko, "displays party style in the work
of an economic leader."

Other points made by Vatchenko have a similar thrust. He raised
the need for increased party checking on economic officials, who
he noted are sometimes guilty of fraud, waste and other abuses.
He recalled that since the 24th CPSU Congress, the number of
party organizations which possessed the right to check economic
activities "has significantly increased." He praised the practice
of appointing party officials to economic leadership posts where
they can introduce "the best features of party style" into economic
work. Noting that the December plenum had posed the task of
improving the organizational structure of economic administration,
Vatchenko described the extensive changes in economic organization
which had taken place in his oblast--the reorganization of trusts
and enterprises into combines and associations, and the consolidation
of hundreds of workshops and other units. He proudly declared
that by these measures his oblast had cut administrative personnel
by 9,000.

While Vatchenko by no means denied the need for introducing new
methods--computers, scientific forecasts, sociological data, etc.--he
made it clear that the party itself should closely control the
process of modernization. In addition, he declared that "no matter

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how great are the achievements of the recent scientific-technological revolution," it is "not the machine, but man" which is decisive, and the party has responsibility for training economic leaders and controlling cadres.

DECEMBER 1969 PLENUM In some respects, the current situation resembles the circumstances following the December 1969 plenum. At that plenum, according to subsequent articles and editorials, Brezhnev had severely criticized Gosplan and the central economic administrators for the poor showing of the economy. The same sources indicated that Brezhnev pushed for increased party intervention as a means of remedying the situation. Some partial confirmation of these indications was provided by Brezhnev himself at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, where he recalled with evident approval that the December 1969 plenum had specified that questions of administration do not involve just a "narrow circle of leaders and specialists, but all party, soviet and economic organizations" and that "improvement of administration is an important inherent part" of the party's leadership of the economy.

Following the December 1969 plenum, an early 1970 Central Committee decree ordered party committees of ministries to take a more active role in running their ministries and to act as the Central Committee's agents. Attacks on ministerial indiscipline, bureaucratism and waste were accompanied by a campaign to cut unnecessary administrative personnel and abolish unnecessary administrative links, which by April 1970 had eliminated 133,000 administrative positions in the RSFSR alone. Party officials were introduced into high government positions, such as the case of obkom secretary T.I. Sokolov becoming first deputy chairman of Gosplan. The increased party involvement was symbolically capped in mid-1970, when Brezhnev himself addressed Kosygin's Council of Ministers--the only time Brezhnev has ever so formally intruded in Kosygin's sphere.

DNIPROPETROVSK CLIQUE Brezhnev's Dnepropetrovsk colleagues have been playing a prominent role in promoting this "party style" theme. Although Brezhnev's December plenum statements implying a greater party role in economic administration have not caught on widely, two leading organs of the Ukrainian Central Committee--whose first secretary is former Dnepropetrovsk leader Shcherbitskiy--have recently picked up the themes enthusiastically in editorials. The 19 July issue of the daily RYANSKA UKRAINA and the August issue of the monthly theoretical journal KOMUNIST UKRAINY quoted all of Brezhnev's plenum statements on assertion of "party style," condemnation of a "technocratic" approach, and definition of "two pillars."

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Another former Dnepropetrovsk official, G.E. Tsukanov, Brezhnev's longtime assistant for domestic affairs, was identified as the authorizing agent for the publication of the volume containing Brezhnev's controversial December 1973 plenum remarks--a collection of Brezhnev's agricultural speeches published on 14 February in connection with the mid-March virgin land anniversary. In a comparatively rare indication of editorial responsibility, the last page of the volume carries the inscription: "Responsible for issuing--G.E. Tsukanov."

This volume is unusual in that it includes excerpts from Brezhnev's unpublished December plenum speech. The main collection of Brezhnev speeches--four volumes covering the period of 19 October 1964 through 24 March 1974--does not include any Brezhnev speeches at Central Committee plenums which were not published at the time of the plenums. Even the fourth volume of Brezhnev speeches, covering June 1972 to March 1974, which came out on 21 March--after the agricultural collection--included nothing from the December 1973 speech. The big four-volume collection was prepared under the supervision of Brezhnev's foreign affairs assistant A.M. Aleksandrov, who likewise signed each volume as "responsible for issuing." The separately issued agricultural volume included not only Brezhnev's statements on agriculture but several of his statements calling for an increased party role in running the economy--statements which appear to have aroused controversy.*

PRAVDA announced on 2 August that an updated, "enlarged" version of the agricultural collection has been issued. The reissuing of a Brezhnev collection only months after the original edition is unique, and certainly cannot be explained by any large volume of new material which could be included. Brezhnev has delivered few speeches this year and only two touching on agriculture. It remains to be seen whether anything has been added to or deleted from the new edition.

SHIFT OF SOME GOSPLAN POWERS TO MINISTRIES UNDER CONSIDERATION

Organizational changes affecting the relative powers and respective functions of Gosplan and the USSR ministries were among the issues discussed at the December 1973 CPSU plenum, judging by two recent articles by top government officials. Gosplan Deputy Chairman

* For evidence of contention over these remarks, see the Supplementary Article in the 14 August 1974 TRENDS, "Contention over Party Role in Leading Soviet Economy."

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A.V. Bachurin, writing in the 26 August issue of ECONOMIC GAZETTE, indicated that the plenum had recommended the transfer of some Gosplan powers to the ministries. Meanwhile, apparently encouraged by the attitudes expressed at the plenum, reform-minded Minister of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems K.N. Rudnev argued in the 15 August TRUD that ministries should be given more extensive rights in planning.

Although both officials raised the subject of transferring powers to ministries, Bachurin argued that important disagreements must be resolved before this can be done. Rudnev complained of duplication in planning by ministries and planning organs and declared that there was an urgent need to decide the question of expanding the rights of ministries, especially in planning and administration. Bachurin, noting the discussion at the December plenum, concluded that "apparently" some of the functions of his organization can be transferred to branch ministries. However, he added that "raising the role of ministries and expanding their independence" depend on resolution of other questions, especially the matter of transferring ministries to a production association structure. He pointed out that the ministries have been slow in fulfilling the March 1973 decree ordering establishment of production associations, and that there was still widespread disagreement as to whether a ministry should be regarded primarily as an administrative organ or an economic organ. Bachurin stated that he personally favored keeping ministries basically administrative.

Rudnev, a pioneer in establishing cost-accounting production associations, took the opposite viewpoint in his article, strongly urging that ministries be made economically responsible, just like enterprises and production associations. Rudnev thus goes beyond the 1973 decision to replace ministries' main administrations with production associations, transferring the ministries' subdivisions to operation on principles of economic incentive and leaving only the top level of the ministry as an administrative organ.

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NOTES

GLERK VISIT TO U.S.: More than a month in advance of PZPR First Secretary Glerk's scheduled visit to the United States starting 8 October, Warsaw media have begun publicizing and stressing the importance of the event. The visit was announced almost simultaneously by Warsaw and Moscow on 28 August, with TASS' report citing PAP to the effect that the visit, at President Ford's invitation, would enable the two leaders to review bilateral relations and "exchange viewpoints on problems of mutual interest." TRYBUNA LUDU on the 30th went to considerable lengths to stress that the visit was in line with detente policies initiated by the Soviet Union, with which Poland has "an unbreakable alliance." The paper noted that this would be the first official U.S. visit by a leader of the Polish People's Republic, while a Bereżowski talk on Warsaw radio on the 29th added that Glerk's trip would be "the first meeting of the leader of a socialist state with the new President of the United States, Gerald Ford." Both commentaries cited former President Nixon's 1972 visit to Warsaw as a turning point in improving Polish-U.S. relations. Glerk will be the first top leader of one of Moscow's orthodox East European allies to visit the U.S.; of the mavericks, Tito visited Washington in October 1971 and Ceausescu in December 1973.

SLOVAK UPRISING ANNIVERSARY: Routine expressions of Soviet-Czechoslovak solidarity marked the observance of the 30th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising at Banska Bystrica on 29 August. The level of Soviet representation, Politburo member Grechko, was lower than at the previous decennial in August 1964, when Khrushchev headed the Soviet delegation to the 20th anniversary. Mazurov, also a CPSU Politburo member, headed the Soviet delegation at the 25th anniversary in 1969. As in 1969, anti-Peking polemics were avoided; in 1964 Khrushchev had attacked the Chinese "splitters." Both Grechko and Husak in their Banska Bystrica speeches praised Brezhnev personally for his contribution to detente, although Husak's anniversary article in PRAVDA on the 28th did not mention Brezhnev. There was no mention of a new world party conference by Grechko or Husak, who confined themselves to calls for communist unity. Muted references by the two principals to "difficulties" experienced by Czechoslovakia in the recent past were in contrast to a blunt reference to "the attempt of the counter-revolution in 1968" by conservative CPCZ Presidium member Bilak at a followup meeting in Bratislava on 30 August.

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MOSCOW ON RESUMPTION OF CSCE: With the resumption on 2 September of the second stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Soviet commentators have indicated some optimism that the conference has entered the "final stretch." TASS observer Goncharov on the 2d, for example, without minimizing the complex nature of the "comparatively small number" of outstanding issues, suggested that the compromise agreements reached on both humanitarian and military observer issues prior to the 26 July recess should provide an impetus in the current session. However, IZVESTIYA foreign affairs editor Grigoryants on the 1st suggested some concern that CSCE might be delayed by developments in the eastern Mediterranean. He argued that "no developments, not even the most dramatic, such as the Middle East war last October or the current Cyprus crisis, should put in question the conference," but rather the opposite--that these events increase the significance of a successful CSCE conclusion. Regarding the timing of the conference's proposed summit-level, third-phase finale, Moscow has demonstrated some ambivalence, with routine-level commentaries generally asserting that the third phase could be held before the end of 1974. But reserve on this issue was revealed in a comprehensive assessment of the negotiations by "M. Lvov" in the 9 August weekly NEW TIMES (No. 32), which said only that the USSR hoped to complete the conference's work "in the shortest possible time." East European official spokesmen, on the other hand, repeatedly went on record during the recess with optimistic views that phase two could finish within a few weeks, with the finale held before the end of the year.

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: Wang Hung-wen, one of the five vice chairmen of the CCP, appears to be taking on heavier party responsibilities as old age and poor health continue to curtail the activities of the CCP's top leaders. Of the five party vice chairmen, only Wang has appeared publicly since the annual Army Day anniversary eve reception on 31 July. Recently, for example, Wang headed the list of leaders at both the departure and return airport ceremonies for a high-level Chinese party and government delegation to Romania, a role that normally would have been played by Chou En-lai, who has not made any public appearances since 31 July. Chou's failure to appear with the President of Togo during the latter's visit to Peking from 2-5 September marked the first time that Chou has not met a visiting chief of state. In his 2 September banquet speech in Peking, President Edyema wished Chou "a quick recovery." Kang Sheng has not appeared since the party congress last year and apparently has serious health problems. The usually active Yeh Chien-ying has not appeared publicly for nearly five weeks. There

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In no indication that Yeh, a strong supporter of Chou's moderate policies, is in any political trouble. He was named by NCNA on 3 September as one of those sending a wreath to a recently deceased deputy to the third National People's Congress. Li Te-sheng has not appeared since May Day and was under heavy pointer attack during the spring.

CHINESE MILITIA: Throughout the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, urban militia units have been reorganized and used by the party to maintain social order in the cities. Judging by a 3 September Singing broadcast, a new drive is underway, at least in Tsinghai, aimed at extending militia reforms to the more remote rural areas. The broadcast revealed that selected militia units in a rural county were recently reorganized and that plans are being made to build up the militia in pastoral areas in the coming winter-spring period. Like their urban counterparts, rural militia units apparently are being given the means to firmly deal with social disorders should they occur. Tsinghai militia authorities paid "special attention" to reorganizing and consolidating "the armed backbone militia."

SPANISH SAHARA: Moscow's meager attention to Morocco's campaign to "recover its territories" of Spanish Sahara has avoided acknowledging Rabat's claims and presented the issue simply as an anti-colonialist struggle variously waged by Morocco, "North African peoples" and by the "indigenous population." Soviet media, in terse reports on the 27-29 August visit of Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki to Moscow, did not mention that his talks with Mazurov and Illichev "centered in particular" on the Spanish Sahara issue, as Rabat radio said on the 29th. A Moscow radio review of Maghreb events, broadcast in Arabic on the 21st, blandly noted Morocco's "decisive actions" to liquidate the "foreign colonial presence in the so-called Spanish Sahara" and reported King Hassan as declaring that Morocco preferred a peaceful course "to liberate" all regions still under the colonial yoke but reserved the right to "other means and methods" if Spain did not respond. The broadcast observed that the "elimination of Spanish colonialism" demanded by all sections of Moroccan public opinion was "quite reasonable." A broadcast in English to Africa on the 22d, however, did not even mention Morocco in commenting on Spain's announced decision to hold a referendum next year on self-determination in "western Sahara." The broadcast said it was too early to predict what might happen, but that a new stage in the struggle of the

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"Indigenous population" was developing. And a French-language broadcast to the Maghreb on 28 August depicted "the people of Morocco and other North African countries" as waging a fight for decolonization of Spanish Sahara against colonialists and imperialist monopolies attempting to maintain control over the area's phosphate resources.

PRC-AFRICA: Peking has lauded the 26 August agreement on Portuguese recognition of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the withdrawal of Lisbon's armed forces as proof of its longstanding position that continuing armed struggle is the best means for the complete liberation of Portuguese Africa. A 4 September Chou En-lai congratulatory message--echoing a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and remarks by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on the 2d--said that Guinea Bissau's success is the result of "the protracted armed struggle in which the heroic people of Guinea-Bissau have persevered." NCNA on 28 August praised the 26 August accord as "a new victory under new circumstances" but carefully admonished that only by relying on armed struggle had the Africans managed to overcome alleged military and political maneuvers by the new Lisbon government to impose a settlement short of total independence. Though not mentioning Moscow by name, NCNA criticized the Soviet stance favoring a cease-fire and a negotiated solution and Moscow's cautious optimism about Portugal's intentions, stating that Guinea Bissau's achievement "is by no means a 'gift' from the colonialists nor is it a product of 'peaceful transition.'"

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 26 AUGUST -- 1 SEPTEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2605 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (966 Items)</u>		
Slovak Uprising 30th Anniversary	(--)	11%	Seventh Asian Games, Teheran	(9%)	15%
[Grechko Speech In Czechoslovakia	(--)	3%]	Law of the Sea Conference	(1%)	11%
Cyprus Crisis	(13%)	9%	Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius	(7%)	7%
China	(9%)	7%	UN World Population Conference, Bucharest	(5%)	6%
Chile	(3%)	4%	Romanian Liberation 30th Anniversary	(15%)	5%
Soyuz 15 Flight	(--)	3%	PRC-Laos Civil Air Agreement	(--)	3%
DRV National Day	(1%)	2%	Vietnam*	(2%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Additional Peking items on DRV National Day were monitored starting 2 September, and will be reflected in the next statistical table.